The wars in Ukraine and around Iran have once again brought to the forefront a question that often seems technical but in reality determines the fate of states: how willing is a leader to hear not only convenient assessments but also unpleasant truths. American analyst Michael Dempsey, former acting director of U.S. national intelligence, writes in a column for Forbes about the cost of political decisions made in an atmosphere of secrecy, overconfidence, and pressure on professional analysis.
His main thesis is simple: even strong power becomes weak if honest debate disappears within the system.
For the Israeli audience, this topic sounds particularly acute. Israel lives in a region where an incorrect intelligence assessment, a miscalculation of the enemy, or belief in a “quick operation” can lead not to theoretical losses, but to rockets, mobilization, economic impact, and human casualties.
When debate stops within the system, the decision becomes dangerous.
One of Dempsey’s key examples is the events leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He recalls a meeting of the Russian Security Council where Vladimir Putin publicly embarrassed the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin.
Naryshkin tried to cautiously speak about the possibility of giving additional time to the Minsk agreements and not rushing to recognize the so-called “LNR” and “DNR.” But the scene itself showed the main point: by that time, there was almost no room for alternative opinions in the Russian system.
It was not just an episode of political theater. It was a symptom.
When a leader expects not analysis but confirmation of a decision already made, intelligence turns into a decoration. The meeting becomes not a tool for reality-checking but a procedure for collective agreement. In such an atmosphere, even professionals begin to guess what the boss wants to hear instead of saying what is really happening.
Ukraine as an example of a strategic mistake.
Dempsey assesses the war against Ukraine as Vladimir Putin’s biggest strategic mistake. According to his logic, the Kremlin counted on one scenario but got another: a protracted war, huge losses, sanction pressure, the militarization of Europe, and increased threats to Russian territory itself.
Before the invasion, Russian propaganda could still play on the theme of “brotherly peoples” and common ties.
However, after February 2022, this language was quickly replaced by rhetoric of war against the West, defense of “values,” and confrontation with an external enemy.
This is precisely where the danger of closed thinking is visible. If there are no people within the system who can say, “the plan won’t work,” then after the failure, there is only explaining why the disaster was supposedly inevitable.
For Israel, this lesson is not abstract. Any country living under constant threat must distinguish decisiveness from self-deception. A quick decision can be correct, but only if it is verified by professional assessment and not built on a political desire to appear strong.
The Iranian example: when a short operation is promised.
Dempsey’s second example is the decision by Donald Trump’s administration to start a military operation against Iran.
According to him, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented assessments to the White House that portrayed the Iranian regime as vulnerable and the operation itself as quick, limited, and manageable.
But, as the analyst writes, some of these forecasts did not materialize. The conflict turned out to be more complex and costly than expected.
It is important not to oversimplify here. Iran is indeed one of the main enemies of Israel and Ukraine: it supports terrorist structures in the Middle East, develops missile-drone programs, and assists Russia in the war against Ukraine. But even when the enemy is obvious, it does not negate the need for precise calculation.
A good strategy is not built solely on the right moral position. It requires understanding resources, time, allies’ reactions, enemy behavior, and the cost of mistakes.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in such topics is important to consider not only as a news agenda but also as a security issue for Israeli society: what happens when political leadership hears only convenient arguments and pushes aside inconvenient assessments.
Why this is important for Israel.
Israel has faced situations many times where intelligence data, political expectations, and public pressure diverged.
Sometimes the state needs to act quickly. Sometimes delay is more dangerous than risk. But Dempsey is not talking about weakness or indecision. He is talking about something else: a leader must be able to create a system where professionals are not afraid to argue, and bad news is not considered betrayal.
This is especially important against the backdrop of threats from Iran, proxy groups, missile programs, drones, and cyberattacks. When war changes faster than bureaucracy can write reports, a closed decision-making system becomes a dangerous luxury.
Politics, business, and the cost of distorted information.
Dempsey draws a parallel not only with war but also with the corporate sector. Company leaders also often face distorted information. Subordinates may embellish reports, hide problems, and adjust to the expectations of owners or investors.
In business, such a mistake can cost money, reputation, and jobs. In politics and war, the price is higher: human lives, destroyed cities, regional instability, and years of consequences.
Therefore, the main conclusion of the article is not reduced to criticizing a specific leader. It is about the principle of management. A strong system is not one where everyone quickly agrees. A strong system is one where unpleasant questions are asked before a decision.
Objectivity as a survival tool.
For Ukraine, the cost of Russia’s mistake became a war for existence. For Israel, the topic of Iran remains a matter of national security. For the U.S., it is a matter of trust in intelligence, allied commitments, and global influence.
Against this backdrop, Dempsey’s thought sounds extremely practical: objective analysis does not guarantee a perfect decision, but without it, the risk of catastrophe sharply increases. A leader can have a political vision. He can go against the majority. He can make decisions in conditions of uncertainty. But if an environment is created around him where alternative assessments are not heard or are heard only for the record, the state begins to move blindly.
And then the mistake ceases to be personal.
It becomes national.