Former US Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker stated that the Ukrainian experience of modern warfare needs to be integrated into the current defense model of the United States. It’s not just about helping Kyiv, but a broader issue: the battlefield has changed faster than Western armies have managed to adjust their doctrines, budgets, and industry.
Why the Ukrainian experience has become a matter of Western security
In an interview with Ukrinform, Volker emphasized that the US, the American defense industry, and many Western countries do not fully realize how important what Ukraine is doing has become for them. According to him, weapons that were considered key three years ago, including HIMARS, ATACMS, and artillery, no longer play the same role as in the early stages of the large war.
This does not mean that such systems have become unnecessary. They remain important, especially against large targets, command posts, warehouses, logistics, and distant objects.
But the war no longer looks like a confrontation of only expensive missiles, heavy artillery, and classic armored operations. Drones, mobile groups, electronic warfare, quick cheap solutions, and the ability to adapt literally within weeks have come to the forefront.
The main lesson from Ukraine — the cost of a shot has become a strategic factor
Volker drew attention to a problem well understood in Israel: you cannot endlessly respond with a million-dollar missile to a threat that costs tens of times less. American systems may be among the best in the world, but they are extremely expensive, and their stocks are not infinite.
That is why the Ukrainian war has become a laboratory for new defense. Ukraine was forced to seek solutions not in ideal conditions, but under constant Russian strikes, including with the use of Iranian Shahed.
Such a school of war is harsh, but it has yielded results. Kyiv has learned to build a layered defense where expensive systems are not spent on every cheap target but are complemented by more affordable interception means, drones, mobile fire groups, and technological solutions on the ground.
Israeli context: Patriot, Iran, and the problem of expensive defense
For the Israeli audience, Volker’s words sound especially clear. During the recent conflict with Iran, the cost of interception became not a theory but a question of the sustainability of the entire defense model. According to Ukrinform, citing CSIS estimates, the US had about 2330 Patriot interceptor missiles before the war against Iran, and then could use from 1060 to 1430 such missiles; the cost of one missile was estimated at about 3.9 million dollars, and the time to replenish stocks from the manufacturer was up to 42 months.
This is the very trap of expensive defense.
If the opponent launches a relatively cheap drone, and the defending side is forced to use a million-dollar missile against it, even a successful interception does not always mean a strategic victory. On the contrary, the opponent can achieve the depletion of the budget, stocks, and production capabilities.
In Israel, this logic has been understood for a long time, but the events of recent years have shown: even a developed air defense system needs constant updating. You cannot build security only on super-expensive interceptors when the opponent bets on mass, cheapness, and attrition.
That is why in the middle of this discussion it is important to see not only the American or Ukrainian but also the Middle Eastern context. For readers of NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency this topic is directly related to the question of how Israel, Ukraine, and the West should together respond to the same threat: the Russian-Iranian model of war, where drones, missiles, and propaganda work as a single pressure system.
Ukraine did not replace Patriot — it showed what it needs to be complemented with
Volker specifically emphasized that it is not about abandoning Patriot or other expensive systems. They are still needed, especially against ballistic missiles and complex air threats.
But if you rely only on them, the current defense model will be difficult to maintain in the long term. The Ukrainian experience shows a different approach: expensive means should be part of the system, not the only response to every threat.
This is especially important for countries living next to aggressive regimes. Israel faces Iran and its proxies. Ukraine faces Russia, which uses Iranian technologies and its own mass strike means. The US and Europe are forced to look at both theaters simultaneously and understand: the future war will not wait for industry to replenish stocks over years.
What exactly the West should take from Ukraine
Ukraine has effectively revolutionized the approach to war not because it had more resources, but because resources were lacking. This forced the creation of cheap drones, new ways to combat UAVs, flexible production schemes, and fast technology implementation lines.
Volker is talking about exactly this: Ukrainian solutions need not just be studied in reports but integrated into the defense models of the US and allies.
New defense must be faster than industrial bureaucracy
The classic Western defense system often works for years: tenders, tests, certification, contracts, production, supplies. In peacetime, such a model seems reliable.
In war, it can be late.
The Ukrainian model was born in a different logic: a threat was discovered, a temporary solution was found, tested on the front, improved, scaled. Yes, such a system does not always look perfect from the point of view of paperwork. But it provides what is especially valuable in modern warfare — speed.
For the US, this means the need to reconsider not only arsenals but also the mindset itself. You cannot only purchase the most expensive systems and think they will solve all tasks. Cheap interceptors, mass drones, swarm protection, flexible electronics, fast modernization, and production that can respond not in years but in months are needed.
Why this is important for Ukraine, Israel, and the entire West
Volker’s conclusion sounds extremely practical: the Ukrainian experience has already become part of Western security, even if the West itself has not fully recognized it yet.
Ukraine today is not just receiving help. It is producing knowledge that allies need. It shows how to fight against an army that relies on mass, terror, missiles, drones, and a willingness to expend people without count.
For Israel, there is also an important signal here. The war with Iran and its allies cannot be considered separately from Russia’s war against Ukraine. These regimes exchange technologies, political lessons, and methods of pressure. This means democratic countries must also exchange not only statements of support but real defense solutions.
Volker’s words are important for this very reason. He is not talking about symbolic gratitude to Ukraine, but about the need to restructure Western defense taking into account Ukrainian practice. In the new war, the winner is not only the one with the most expensive missile but the one who can respond quickly, massively, and intelligently to a cheap but dangerous threat.